Pola Roupa: They want to send me back to prison

Based on the reasoning of this appeal, the arguments and the "evidence" it cites, it is a given that no prosecutor would deal with them if they concerned any other prisoner or detainee.For example, the deputy prosecutor of the Evia Court of Appeals "denunces" with his appeal the "methodology" followed by the Thebes misdemeanor council, namely, the fact that I was not summoned to attend the council in person when it was considering my application for conditional release, while thousands of women were released from Eleona prison before me with exactly the same methodology and no prosecutor ever dealt with any of them. Because according to the –obviously correct– approach to the issue by the Thebes misdemeanor councils, the prosecutor who proposes for the conditional release of a prisoner is the one who is also in the prison, knows the prisoners and in cooperation with the service, which is the one that has the most "friction" with the women, has a particularly weighty opinion that cannot be objectively overturned by presence via skype for a few minutes of the prisoner before the Council, which is made up of people who will see her for the first time. The presence of a detainee at the council for her conditional release is only possible if the prosecutor's proposal is negative, and this in order to check in essence again whether the extension of her detention proposed is correct.

It is impossible for me to believe that the prosecutors of Evia are now learning for the first time about the methodology followed for decades for the prisoners of Eleona prison by countless judicial councils of Thebes (and Athens, since the same method is applied in Korydallos prison). Only in my case was an appeal made, apparently because ... it is me and because there is a political background and motivation. Another point of the appeal is the prosecutor's invocation of acquittal decisions on disciplinary reports related to mobilizations at Korydallos prison in 2017. Apart from the fact that these decisions are acquittal –and while even disciplinary convictions, as provided for by the Penitentiary Code, are not sufficient to prevent the conditional release of a prisoner– it does not seem to have been of concern the fact that these reports and acquittals concerned dozens of detainees who participated in the protests. But not one of these women faced any problems during the process of her conditional release over these issues. The mere fact that they are cited as arguments for my re-imprisonment is indicative of the kind of ground on which the argument rests and the degree of arbitrariness that is attempted to be exercised over me.

What undoubtedly permeates this specific appeal is that what it wants (or to be more precise, what they want) from me are declarations of political loyalty and declarations of repentance. This can be inferred, inter alia, from the reference he makes to the reasoning of the first two rejection decisions of the prison council in my initial applications for regular leave, whose arguments were political, since the first decision concerned political positions I hadfrom time to time expressed publicly and in courts (in essence, it was my defense "line"), the second of which concerned my book "State vs. Commune". The seven regular leaves I had taken in total are considered an unsatisfactory reason for granting me conditional release, while the political justification of the rejection decisions on my first two applications for regular leave, which were subsequently overturned, is considered more important. Nor is it a matter of significance that the one prison prosecutor cited in his appeal by the prosecutor of appeals is the one who finally gave me five regular and two 48-hour emergency leaves for serious family reasons, one of which was without police escort, while she was the same one who made the positive proposal to the Thebes misdemeanor council for my conditional release from prison. In short, he "reproaches" the prosecutor for not taking into account ... herself, an old, opinion of her own that she expressed a year and a half ago.

I am not going to elaborate further on the grounds of the appeal in this text, but these elements are indicative of my claim that this is a politically motivated and intentional move, since an appeal against a decision of a board for conditional release of a prisoner is not made on the basis of ... doubts which, apart from anything else, are also untenable, but based on strong and tangible evidence. Besides, the institution of conditional release has never been and is not a "favor", but a measure that must be granted with any "doubt" that is not sufficient for the unconditional extension of detention. Otherwise, there is no point in the existence of this institution and in my case –if the Court of Appeals finally imposes a re-imprisonment on me– it is circumvented and practically abolished (initially for me, then for others) the right to conditional dismissal.

Such a condition of substantial abolition of the right to conditional release has also reached the Lamia misdemeanor council, which insists on refusing for the umpteenth time the release of my comrade Nikos Maziotis from Domokos prison and despite the fact that he has served much more time than expected in prison.

The Thebes misdemeanor court that decided on my release was the one that considered that I cannot be exempted from the right to conditional release, as no prisoner has been granted an exception regime for any reason. The proposal of the prosecutor of Thebes to accept my release is permeated by the view that I am not exempted from the right to conditional release for political reasons. Against this view and in favor of my reimprisonment for reasons of political beliefs, positions, beliefs and values, the appeal of the prosecutor of appeals of Evia is directed, asking that I be placed in a state of excemption for political reasons. It is my belief that the dominant element in this move and method is that it is perceived as a "political defeat" for certain systemic circles that I was released from prison and that "correction" for this is the indefinite extension of my detention. Because if the Evia Court of Appeals accepts to lock me up again in prison by adopting the grounds of the appeal, that is without evidence and facts but only political speculations, then this will mean that they want to keep meindefinitely in prison. All this cannot happen for any other reason than the political nature of the case for which I stayed in prison for 8.5 years (thirteen years "mixed"), the action of the Revolutionary Struggle, but mainly because of my political attitude towards persecutions and trials. This historical course of mine must be "effectively addressed". This is a move of pure political revenge.

P.S.: Some journalists during the days of my release tried to create a political climate of discontent with my release –and apparently succeeded– focusing on an old life sentence imposed on me by a first-degree court for the attack of the Revolutionary Struggle on the building of the Bank of Greece (the branch of the ECB) and the IMF in 2014, without having any knowledge of its subject-matter, the accusation and its nature, law and political springsof the specific court that wanted for purely political reasons to impose this sentence as a response to the dynamic resistance against the "memorandums" (this action was directed against the then troika). The power held by some in their hands, combined with illiteracy or even complete ignorance, becomes dangerous.

I would like then to inform you that the law by which both my comrade Nikos Maziotis and I were condemned at the time for that act of the Revolutionary Struggle was a law, 270 PC, imposed by presidential decree by the Papadopoulos government in 1969 to counter the dynamic actions (bombings) that were taking place at that time against the colonels' junta .We had raised this many times in the courts and asked for its non-implementation (there are plenty of audio and texts from our courts where we have taken a position on the issue and can be easily found by anyone), given that, apart from the heavy political past of this law, the deeply reactionary background that connects the era with the years of the "memorandums" and the resistance to them, it was a law that threatened to become a springboard for arbitrariness in the courts. This had been pointed ou tby recognized legal analysts (e.g. Manoledakis Ioannis, Criminal Law General Theory pp 271, 276, 338, D. Spyrakou, Abstract endangerment: a dangerous construction for Criminal Law, Pen. Chron. 1993) who were opposed to "abstract risk" laws such as this one. With such a law it is possible to convict someone (even with the ultimate penalty) not for the result of the act, but for what the act can potentially cause, which is called mental punishment and is judged on the basis of the degree of deceit that the judge will accuse the accused for causing an outcome.

In our case, a multitude of arbitrariness was used by the two courts, since, even as the law was, it required many mental acrobatics to argue for this sentence. The most important element in their argument was our political positions during the trials. Eventually, this law was amended by the P.C. of 2019 along with other "abstract risk" laws to finally become concrete and cease to be a tool for arbitrariness in the courts. If some people have a real interest in these issues and do not want to reduce themselves to reactionary parrots of dark power circles, let them stop referring to things they do not know, and read. Otherwise, those who persist in criticizing my release using this argument will have to accept that they are advocating for the resurrection of a junta law with a rich history of political and ideological arbitrariness.

Pola Roupa

22/12/2023